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Title Insurance: Recovery for Emotional Distress 
for Wrongful Failure to Defend 
One of the benefits1 title insurance policies are designed to 
provide is a powerful, tenacious defender when a potential ad- 
verse claimant challenges the validity of the insured's title.2 How- 
ever, because the title insurance company often has little to lose 
1. The title insurance industry has received much criticism in recent years. The basic 
problem seems to be that few benefits are received for the price paid for title insurance. 
Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 494-95 (1957); Quiner, Title Insurance and 
the Title Insurance Industry, 22 DRAKE INS. L. ANN. 711 (1973); Roberts, Title Insurance: 
State Regulation and the Public Perspective, 39 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1963). Attempted attacks 
on or reforms of the title insurance industry have focused on three general areas. First, 
attempts have been made to increase legislative control of the industry at the state and 
national level. Mortgage Settlement Costs: Hearings on S. 2775 Before the Subcomm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). A recent article on title 
insurance summarizes the state of legislation in this area as follows: 
The environment in which title insurance operates seems very conducive to 
profit. State regulation seems to be lacking. Strict regulation systems do not 
appear to be prevalent, and in general, regulation is not as effective as with 
property and casualty insurance. Moreover, title insurance companies are oper- 
ated predominately in oligopolies. 
Quiner, supra at  727. The legislative approach to solving the problems of title insurance 
seems to have lost momentum in recent years. 
Second, in the absence of legislative action, opponents of the title insurance industry 
have turned to the courts in an effort to regulate the industry under the federal antitrust 
acts. The thrust of their argument has been that the title insurance industry is monopolis- 
tic and devoid of any meaningful price competition and should, therefore, be broken up 
and regulated by the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 
518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 
302 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 
(10th Cir. 1973). These cases held, however, that title insurance is "insurance," as the 
word is used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 8  1011-1015 (1970), and qualifies 
for the insurance exemption from federal antitrust laws. Because of this interpretation by 
the courts, this approach has not been successful. See Note, The Applicability of Anti- 
trust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 810 (1973). 
A third approach relies upon general insurance law concepts and asks the courts to 
broadly interpret the duties owed by title insurers to their clients. Examples of this 
approach include the courts' willingness to find a "duty to search" from the surrounding 
circumstances, which allows a recovery in tort notwithstanding the contract provisions. 
For an excellent summary of this topic, see Comment, Title Insurance: The Duty to 
Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Search]. 
2. Title insurance has been criticized as being a marginal investment for a home- 
owner. Roberts, supra note 1, a t  5; Johnstone, supra note 1, a t  494. Commentators gener- 
ally'agree, however, that "[olne advantage that title insurance provides over other forms 
of title protection is that the title insurer agrees to defend a t  its expense all litigation 
against the insured based upon a title defect covered in the policy." Johnstone, supra note 
1, a t  499-500. Roberts, supra note 1, a t  4, states: "Most significant, perhaps, is the fact 
that the company undertakes to defend the title as insured: in effect, if nothing else, the 
vendee has retained a powerful champion against the day a potential adverse claimant 
appears." 
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by refusing to defend when policy coverage is in doubt, the in- 
sured may find himself without a defender.3 The insurer's refusal 
to defend may result in inconvenience, lost business opportuni- 
ties, and mental distress to the insured-none of which can be 
recovered using traditional remedies.' In the recent California 
case of Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance C O . , ~  however, 
the jury awarded damages of $200,000 for emotional distress 
caused by the title insurer's wrongful failure to defend.R This 
comment will briefly review traditional remedies for wrongful 
failure to defend under title insurance policy terms and discuss 
recent developments that may provide remedies that encourage 
title insurers to defend. 
A. The Duty to Defend 
Title insurance policies generally contain a clause that obli- 
gates the company to defend the insured to the extent the dis- 
pute involves an aIleged defect covered by the policy.' General 
insurance law looks to the face of the complaint to determine 
whether the injuries are within the terms of the policy coverage? 
Under this rule, if the formal claim against the insured alleges 
facts within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is obligated to 
3. If a title insurer refuses to defend, forcing the insured to defend his title, and the 
court finds no policy coverage, then the title insurer incurs no liability. If, however, the 
court determines that the title policy covered the defect, then the company is liable for 
costs and losses incurred by the insured in defending the action. Further, the insurer is 
bound by the material findings of fact in the suit against the insured and is liable for 
judgments or reasonable settlements that result. The insured may, however, have to bring 
a second action against the insurer to enforce the holding of the first action. See Curtis, 
Title Assurance in Sales of California Residential Realty: A Critique of Title Insurance 
and Title Covenants with Suggested Reforms, 7 PAC. L.J. 1, 15-16 (1976); 9 J. APPLEMAN, 
INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE § 5216 (1943). If there is any question of policy coverage, the 
insurer often comes out ahead by refusing to defend. If it is determined that there was no 
coverage, the insurer has saved the costs of defense; if it is determined that the policy did 
cover the title defect, the insurer often incurs no greater cost than if he had defended. 
4. See text accompanying notes 22-28 infra. 
5. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1975). 
6. Id. a t  925, 122 Cal. Rptr. a t  476. 
7. E. RAEIIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 1011, 1020 (1974); 9 J. 
APPLEMAN, supra note 3, 4 5216. 
8. 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, 5 4683; R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 7.6(a) (1971); 
Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. 
L. REV. 734, 734-35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Defend]; Note, The Insurer's 
Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1328 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Duty to Defend Made Absolute]. Of course, the insurer has the 
burden of proof in cases where the pleadings are ambiguous. 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 
3, § 4683, a t  440. 
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defend, regardless of the true nature of the facts.g Conversely, the 
insurer is under no obligation to defend if the allegations do not 
fit within the policy coverage, regardless of the actual details? 
This rule is criticized as  being inadequate under today's 
relaxed pleading requirements, which are designed only to put 
the opposing party on notice-the complaint often will not pre- 
cisely reflect the opposing party's claim or predict the basis of any 
relief." For example, the complaint may allege only that the in- 
sured is encroaching on the plaintiffs land. Since such a general 
complaint could potentially involve numerous situations, i t  is not 
always a simple task to determine from the face of the complaint 
whether the title insurance company has a duty to defend.12 
Although a title insurance policy usually purports to guaran- 
tee "good and indefeasible title" to the property described by the 
policy,13 this guarantee is subject to numerous standard and 
specially listed exceptions.14 The standard exceptions usually ex- 
empt from coverage any cloud on the title created by instruments 
or acts that are not recorded in public records.I5 Also excluded 
from coverage are clouds on the title that occur as a result of 
unpatented mining claims, water right claims, governmental reg- 
ulations, and eminent domain actions.l6 Any cloud on the title 
found by searching the public records is listed as a special excep- 
tion.17 These standard and specially listed exceptions, which fre- 
quently turn upon technical rules as to what constitutes record 
notice,18 taken together with the complexity of real property law, 
often make it difficult to determine from the pleadings whether 
- - - - ---- - 
9. Duty to Defend Made Absolute, supra note 8, a t  1328-29. 
10. Id. 
11. Duty to Defend, supra note 8, a t  734-35. 
12. See Curtis, supra note 3, a t  16. A complaint alleging that the insured is encroach- 
ing on the plaintiffs land may or may not involve a title dispute that concerns the insurer. 
The insured may have driven on the plaintiffs land without permission, or perhaps 
erected a fence on his neighbor's land. It is often impossible to tell from the pleadings 
exactly what the true nature of the problem is. 
13. 9 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5201, a t  2. 
14. Johnstone, supra note 1, a t  494-97; E. &IN, supra note 7, a t  1017-18. 
15. In addition, standard title insurance policies generally exclude facts, rights, inter- 
ests, or claims not shown by the public record but which could be ascertained by inspec- 
tion of the land or by inquiry of persons in possession thereof. As a result of this exclusion, 
the policyholder has no insurance against easements, encroachments, rights of lessees in 
possession, boundary discrepancies, or similar matters. Curtis, supra note 3, at 5-7. 
16. E. Rmm, supra note 7, at 1017-18. 
17. Johnstone, supra note 1, at 496. Because of these exceptions title insurers, unlike 
other kinds of insurers, assume very little risk. Id. a t  496-97. For a comprehensive descrip- 
tion of the risks assumed by title insurers, see id. at 495-96. 
18. Curtis, supra note 3, at 2. 
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a duty to defend exists.*@ 
Reflecting these criticisms, many states have modified the 
general rule by creating a duty to defend whenever facts reason- 
ably known to the insurer would create a "potential of l i ab i l i t~ . "~~ 
The California court in Jarchow articulated the problem: 
The rule regarding an insurer's duty to defend really can take 
no other form; otherwise the insured would be required to fi- 
nance his own defense and then, only if he is successful, hold the 
insurer to its promise by means of a second suit for reimburse- 
ment. If this construction were followed, a basic reason for the 
purchase of insurance would be defeated: instead of having pur- 
chased insurance against the trauma and financial hardship of 
litigation, the insured will have found that he has purchased 
nothing more than a l a ~ s u i t . ~ '  
A duty to defend measured by a potential of liability is obviously 
a stricter standard providing greater protection to the insured, 
particularly if appropriate remedies for wrongful failure to defend 
exist. 
B. Remedies 
1. Contract remedies 
An insurance policy is a contract.22 If an agreement to defend 
is part of the contract, then wrongful failure to defend is a breach 
of contract and contract remedies are appropriate. When an in- 
surer wrongfully refuses to defend the validity of the insured's 
19. Id. a t  16. An additional problem, unique to title insurance, occurs when a defect 
covered by the title insurance policy exists and is known to the insured, but no adverse 
party has instituted suit. The question then becomes whether the insurer has a duty to 
defend by initiating a quiet title action. Very little case law exists on the subject, but it 
appears that an obligation exists on the part of the insurer to take affirmative action. See 
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917,943 n.18, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 
488 n.18 (Ct. App. 1975); Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 
1973); 9 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, 9 5215; 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 704 (1973); 8 Hous. L. REV. 
580 (1971). 
20. Duty to Defend Made Absolute, supra note 8, a t  1330. The following are cases in 
some of the states that follow the "potential of liability" standard in determining the 
existence of a duty to defend: Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 542 P.2d 1031 
(Ore. 1975); Evans v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 F. Supp. 1230 (D.C. Alas. 1975); 
American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 87 N.M. 375, 533 P.2d 1203 (1975); Spruill 
Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 512 P.2d 403 (1973); First 
Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Continental Cas. Co., 466 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1972)(Hawaii); Shaw v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 407 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1969)(Illinois); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 
Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). 
21. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 942-43, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 488 (Ct. App. 1975). 
22. 9 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5201, a t  1-2. 
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title, the insured is entitled to recover reasonable expenses in 
making the necessary defense.z3 These generally include attor- 
neys' fees and any reasonable settlement accepted by the insured 
in good faitheZ4 As a general rule, damages for mental suffering are 
not available in breach of contract actions, nor are other conse- 
quential damages, such as lost business opportunities or inconve- 
nience, since they usually are not considered within the expecta- 
tions of the contracting parties.25 
A distinction is drawn, however, between commercial con- 
tracts, which promote a pecuniary or business interest (no emo- 
tional distress damages allowed), and personal contracts, such as 
contracts with common carriers or innkeepers, which promote 
some personal interest (emotional distress damages allowed).26 
Historically, courts have viewed insurance contracts as commer- 
cial in nature and have not allowed damages for emotional dis- 
tress.27 It is generally felt that one contracting for insurance seeks 
a pecuniary benefit and that neither party bargains for or expects 
mental distress to accompany a breach of contract.2s 
23. Id. # 5216, a t  23. 
24. Id. ; see note 3 supra. 
25. 5 A. Comm, CONTRACTS $ 1076, a t  429 (1964); 11 W. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS $1341, 
at 214 (3d ed. 1968). 
26. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS $ 1076, a t  429 (1964). The most common types of 
contracts that are considered personal are contracts to marry, contracts of carriers and 
innkeepers with passengers and guests, contracts for the disposition of dead bodies, and 
contracts for the delivery of death messages. The common element in personal contracts 
is the deep feelings involved, which make mental distress likely upon breach of contract. 
See Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the 
Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1303, 1303-04 (1973). 
27. "The traditional measure of contract damages limits recovery to the policy bene- 
fits plus interest. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872). Where 
consequential damages are sought the limitations of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 
145 (1854) control." Comment, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers; Recent 
Developments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1303, 1304 n.9 
(1973). That is, the damages must arise naturally from such breach of contract itself and 
have been reasonably contemplated by both parties at  the time of the contract. J. CALA- 
MARI & J. PERILM, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS $ 206, a t  330 (1970). 
28. See Note, Damages Assessed Against Insurers for Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 466, 467 (1968). Recently, some courts have been swayed by the 
argument that insurance contracts are personal, making it easier for the courts to take 
the position that damages for emotional distress should be awarded in appropriate cases. 
For example, in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 
(1967), the court argued that: 
Moreover, plaintiff did not seek by the contract involved here to obtain a com- 
mercial advantage but to protect herself against the risks of accidental losses, 
including the mental distress which might follow the losses. Among the consid- 
erations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace 
of mind and security it  will provide in the event of an accidental loss, and 
recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted for breach of con- 
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2. Tort remedies 
In view of the inadequacy of breach of contract remedies in 
redressing the insured's injuries, insurance policyholders of all 
kinds have turned to tort law to find a more satisfactory basis for 
recovery.2g If a cause of action in tort can be maintained, the 
possibility of recovery for emotional distress, inconvenience, and 
lost business opportunities exists.30 The tort actions of intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of im- 
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing focus on damages for 
emotional distress and have been used with some success to re- 
dress injuries caused by breach of insurance contract~.~' Courts 
require claims of emotional distress to meet very stringent stan- 
dards, however, because of the .difficulty of proving and measur- 
ing mental injuries and the possibility of vexatious and fictitious 
claims .32 
Early courts refused to allow any recovery for mental distress 
unless i t  could be brought within the scope of some already exist- 
tracts which directly concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one 
of the parties. 
Id. a t  434, 426 P.2d at  179, 58 Cal. Rptr. a t  19. The court did not, however, decide the 
case on the distinction between personal and commercial contracts, but found an inten- 
tional tort, thus making damages for emotional distress available. Id. The general rule is 
still that an insurance contract is a commercial contract, the breach of which will not 
support an award of damages for emotional distress. See Farris v. United States Fidelity 
& Guar. Co., 542 P.2d 1031, 1035-36 (Ore. 1975). 
29. See Note, The Widening Scope of Insurer's Liability, 63 KY. L.J. 145, 148 (1975). 
30. The greatest advantage in suing in tort comes from the likelihood of greater 
damages, since the limitations imposed by the contract on the maximum damages re- 
coverable may be avoided. See, e.g., Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., 60 Minn. 
275, 62 N.W. 287 (1895); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 972 (1958). In addition, tort theory may 
extend to items of damage not includible under contract theory (such as emotional distress 
damages), may allow the plaintiff to avoid possible setoffs or counterclaims, and may 
provide a lighter burden of proof in some instances. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 92, a t  618-22 (4th ed. 1971). Tort theory also provides the court with a more 
flexible method of achieving equitable results. 
Contract theory, however, offers advantages such as a lighter burden of pleading and 
proof in some instances, a longer statute of limitations, recovery of bargain damages, 
recovery of interest from the date of the breach, survival of the action, additional remedies 
such as summary judgment or attachment, and greater opportunities for forum shopping. 
See Duty to Search, supra note 1, at 1182 n.114. 
31. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032,108 Cal. Rptr. 
480 (1973)(breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Eckenrode v. 
Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972)(intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 
(Ct. App. 1975)(negligent infliction of emotional distress). 
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 12, a t  50-51; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 46, 
Comment b at 72 (1965). 
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ing tort, such as false imprisonment or assault.33 Requiring that 
damages for emotional distress be "parasitic" or dependent upon 
the existence of an independent tort was thought to assure the 
genuineness of the claim.34 
Eventually an independent cause of action was recognized 
for infliction of emotional distress, even in the absence of some 
other harm, when the defendant's behavior was of such a nature 
that he knew or should have known that mental distress was 
i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~  The genuineness of claims under this tort, the inten- 
tional infliction of emotional distress, was insured by requiring 
the defendant's behavior to be "so outrageous in character, and 
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of de- 
cency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in 
a civilized c~mmuni ty . "~~  In cases such as these, courts have al- 
lowed damages for mental distress upon proof that the defen- 
dant's conduct was outrageous and that the plaintiff suffered 
severe emotional distrem3' 
Courts have been reluctant to award damages for emotional 
distress inflicted by mere negligence? If the negligent act causes 
only mental distress that is not serious enough to produce physi- 
cal symptoms, such as inability to sleep, loss of weight, ulcers, or 
personality changes, there is general agreement that no recovery 
is allowed.39 Most courts feel that without some physical manifes- 
tation of the mental injury, the indicia of genuineness are lack- 
ing.40 On the other hand, if physical injury such as a broken leg, 
is an immediate result of the defendant's negligent act, most 
courts allow parasitic damages for emotional distress, with 
slightly relaxed criteria of proof.41 Thus, if severe emotional dis- 
tress accompanies a broken leg, damages are appropriate not only 
for the broken leg but also for the emotional distress. The imme- 
diate physical harm is thought to authenticate the claim for emo- 
tional distress.42 
33. See Davis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 W. Va. 48,32 S.E. 1026 (1899); 46 MISS. 
L.J. 871 (1975). 
34. See 63 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1183 (1975). 
35. See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 12. 
36. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 44 (1956). 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS !j 46 (1965). 
38. Greyson, Recent Developments in the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Shocks, 
3 N. KY. ST. L.F. 76, 82 (1975). 
39. See id. at 82-83. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 83. 
42. Id. 
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Where the physical symptoms are not immediate, but follow 
subsequently as a result of the shock created by the defendant's 
negligent act, the law is not as straightforward. Originally, dam- 
ages for emotional distress in such cases were awarded only when 
accompanied by some "impact" upon the person of the plaintiff 
during the course of the negligent act.43 The presence or absence 
of impact, however, is often a chance occurrence that has little 
effect on the degree of seriousness of mental distress. The rigid 
application of the rule often creates outrageous results.44 In 
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway C O . , ~ ~  for example, a horsedrawn 
trolley charged the plaintiff, not stopping until the horses were 
standing on either side of her. The plaintiff fainted and subse- 
quently suffered a mis~arr iage .~~ The court nevertheless denied 
recovery because it found that she had not experienced an im- 
pact; mere fright was not sufficient to sustain the action?' 
Modern courts have, for the most part, rejected the impact 
rule, and now require that the plaintiff be within a "zone of 
danger" and reasonably fear for his own safety.48 The application 
of this test can also produce harsh results in that it prevents 
recovery by individuals who do not fear for their own safety (are 
outside the zone of danger) but nonetheless suffer genuine emo- 
43. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent 
Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1239 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Negligently Inflicted Mental 
Distress]. See Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Sew. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Bosley 
v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958)(no impact from being chased by trespassing 
bull). 
44. This rule created strained results. Many courts went to absurd lengths to find 
"impact." See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 
(1928)(evacuation of horse's bowels in lap); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 
A.2d 351 (1961) (minor auto collision sufficient impact). Other courts used the impact rule 
to deny recovery for serious mental distress in all cases, regardless of how serious the 
injury. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
45. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
46. Id. a t  109, 45 N.E. a t  354. 
47. Id. 
48. The impact rule has been rejected in most states. The following cases and states 
are cited in Note, Recovery Allowed for Mental Distress Absent Both Impact and Fear of 
Impact, 46 MISS. L.J. 871, 875 n.36 (1975), as still accepting the impact rule. St. Louis 
I.M. & S.R.R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (lWl)(Arkansas); Perry v. Capital 
Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 557 (1929) (District of Colum- 
bia); Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974)(Florida); Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 
401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) (Illinois); Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 
N.E.2d 326 (1945) (Indiana); Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 
(1913)(Iowa); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 
S.W.2d 272 (1929)(Kentucky); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 
(1897)(Massachusetts); Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 
1957)(Missouri); cf. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (Utah). 
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tional distre~s.'~ A parent who witnesses the death of his child 
from the safety of his yard is a common example.50 Several courts 
have attempted to deal with this problem,51 but the majority of 
jurisdictions find that the zone of danger test is necessary to 
insure that claims are genuine and that negligent individuals are 
not exposed to liability that they should not reasonably be ex- 
pected to bear.52 
Application of the traditional impact or zone of danger tests, 
coupled with the requirement that mental distress be severe, has 
consistently led courts to deny damages for emotional distress 
when the emotional distress results from negligent damage to 
property." Valley National Bank v. Brown5' is typical of the ap- 
proach used by most courts. The defendant, Valley National 
Bank, wrongfully and negligently garnished Brown's bank ac- 
count. Brown, suing in tort, prayed for damages for emotional 
distress.55 The court found that as no "physical invasion" of the 
plaintiff's person occurred, no damages for emotional distress 
would be allowed.56 In Murphy v. City of Ta~orna,~' the plaintiff 
sought damages for emotional distress caused by a landslide that 
damaged his real property.58 The court held that 
there is no reason to deviate from the rule requiring either a 
showing of malice or some actual or threatened physical inva- 
sion of the person in order to warrant recovery of damages for 
"mental anguish, suffering, annoyance, discomfort and inconve- 
n i e n ~ e . " ~ ~  
49. See 63 Geo. L.J. 1179, 1186 (1975). 
50. Id; see, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952). 
51. Some courts have extended the scope of liability to allow recovery to individuals 
who directly witness an injury to a close relative and suffer severe emotional distress as a 
result. See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I.), modified, 481 F.2d 
14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 68 Cal. 2d 
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1969). 
52. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 
(1961); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). 
53. See Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 43, at 1242. 
54. 110 Ariz. 260, 517 P.2d 1256 (1974). 
55. Id. at 262, 517 P.2d a t  1258. 
56. Id. at 265, 517 P.2d at 1261. The Court found that: 
[Wlith but a few minor exceptions, the rule is that where no malice or 
intent is shown, no damages may be awarded for mental anguish or distress of 
mind. The exception to the rule occurs when it is shown that there is a physical 
invasion of a person or the person's security. No such physical invasion occured 
[sic] here . . . "no damages can be allowed for mental pain or suffering" in 
actions of this nature. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
57. GO'Wash. 2d 603, 374 P.2d 976 (1962). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 622, 374 P.2d at 988. 
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A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
All states that recognize the intentional infliction of emo- 
tional distress as an independent tort allow recovery for emo- 
tional distress in appropriate insurance cases.60 In Fletcher v. 
Western National Life Insurance CO.,~* the plaintiff sustained a 
back injury in the course of his employment, rendering him un- 
able to work. Examining experts were virtually unanimous in 
their assessment that the plaintiff was disabled because of his 
back injury." Despite overwhelming evidence of its liability, how- 
ever, the insurer attempted to persuade the claimant to accept 
an unfavorable settlement. The insurer accused the insured of 
having misrepresented significant facts in his application for in- 
surance, attempted to characterize the defect as congenital, and 
demanded return of money already paid.s3 The court awarded 
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conclud- 
ing that the conduct of the insurer was outrageous and deplora- 
ble .64 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
applied Illinois law in Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance 
C O . ~ ~  and, like the California court in Fletcher, allowed damages 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress? Following her 
husband's murder, the plaintiff in Eckenrode submitted a claim 
for the proceeds of an insurance policy on her husband's life. The 
insurance company, although fully aware that the plaintiff had a 
valid claim, repeatedly refused payment and attempted to coerce 
her into compromising her claim.17 The court found that the in- 
surance company was on notice of the plaintiffs sensitive state 
of mind following an event so ghastly as the murder of her hus- 
band and that, under the circumstances, the insurer abused its 
superior bargaining position by attempting to coerce a settle- 
ment? In the court's view, such conduct was outrageous enough 
60. Provided the requisite "outrageous" conduct and severe emotional distress were 
shown, there is no reason why recovery would not be granted. See text accompanying notes 
35-37 supra. 
61. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). 
62. Id. at 386-87, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83. 
63. Id. at 388-90, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85. 
64. Id. at 394-96, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88-89. 
65. 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972). 
66. Id. at 4-5. 
67. Id. at 2. 
68. Id. at 2-3. 
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to warrant damages for intentional infliction of mental distress. 
In Frishett u. Sta te  Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
CO.,~' the Michigan Court of Appeals held that an insured could 
recover for emotional distress caused by the insurer's wrongful 
acts, provided that such acts were done with the intent of causing 
emotional distress.'O The insurer had wrongfully withheld medi- 
cal payments, made false statements, and obtained information 
of a private nature to use against the plaintiff.71 
The United States District Court for the District of Connecti- 
cut held that an insured could recover damages for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress where the insurer intentionally 
failed to defend or settle within the policy limits.72 The court, 
holding that an action would lie in contract, in tort, or in both, 
noted that even though the plaintiffs burden of proof might be 
difficult to meet, a cause of action had been stated.73 
It is clear that in those states that recognize an independent 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
damages may be obtained if the conduct of the insurer meets the 
standards of outrageousness required. This, however, is of limited 
value to most title insurance policyholders, as it is only in rare 
circumstances that failure to defend title can be characterized as 
"outrageous" conduct. The vagaries of the exclusions attached to 
a title policy give ample opportunity to base refusal to defend on 
a relatively sound legal theory-at least one that can be invoked 
in good faith.74 Thus, negligence, rather than outrageousness, is 
more often the label that will be applied by the courts to the 
conduct of title insurers. 
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The impact and zone of danger tests severely limit the avail- 
ability of a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress when a title insurer wrongfully fails to defend. As dis- 
cussed previously, states that continue to demand that there be 
some impact upon the plaintiff or that the plaintiff be within the 
zone of danger before negligent infliction of emotional distress is 
actionable generally refuse to recognize a cause of action when the 
69. 3 Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1966). 
70. Id. at 614. 
71. Id. at 612-13. 
72. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 
1972). 
73. Id.. at 872-73. 
74. See text accompanying notes 12-19 supra. 
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emotional distress is a result of injury to a property right." Sev- 
eral recent cases, however, have recognized an independent cause 
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress or have used 
tests that allow recovery for mental distress caused by damage to 
a property interest. 
In First National Bank v. Langley, 76 the plaintiff sought 
damages for emotional distress caused by the bank's negligence 
in searching for a lost deposit that had been placed in the night 
depository.77 It took the plaintiff several weeks to persuade the 
bank to dismantle the mechanism of the night depository in an 
effort to recover the lost deposit. In the meantime, the plaintiff 
was suspected of stealing the deposit.78 The Supreme Court of 
Mississippi held that a defendant whose negligence creates a fore- 
seeable risk of mental distress can be held liable for genuine 
injuries that result from such distre~s.'~ The court expressly aban- 
doned the impact rule and did not use the zone of danger rule to 
limit recovery 
In Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance C O . , ~ ~  the court 
upheld a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis- 
tress.82 The plaintiff contended that as a result of the defendant's 
negligent title search he was unaware of potential adverse claims 
to the title of his property and suffered lost business opportuni- 
ties, lost savings, and emotional distress when these claims were 
The court concluded that if a plaintiff had suffered 
substantial damage apart from the emotional distress, recovery 
for damages for severe emotional distress would be allowed. The 
court reasoned that a plaintiff who has been deprived of the use 
or possession of real or personal property, or suffered physical 
injury, has suffered substantial damage that provides sufficient 
assurance of genuineness to allow recovery for emotional dis- 
tress." The court made it clear, however, that it does not yet 
recognize an independent tort for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress that would permit recovery when mental distress is the 
only damage caused by the defendent's wrongful conduct.85 Yet, 
75. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra. 
76. 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975). 
77. Id. at 327-28. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 339. 
80. Id. 
81. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1975). 
82. Id. at 939-40, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
83. See id. at 950-51, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
84. Id. at 936-39, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 483-85. 
85. Id. at 937 n.11, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484 n.11. 
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by using a standard based upon substantial damage apart from 
the emotional distress, rather than the impact test or the zone of 
danger test, the California courts are approaching recognition of 
an independent tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
In fact, the Jarchow court concluded that the "indorsement of 
such an action seems to be the logical end product of the deci- 
sional trends in this area."86 
The most straightforward treatment of damages for the neg- 
ligent infliction of emotional distress is offered by the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii. In Rodrigues v. State,87 the plaintiffs home was 
flooded due to the negligence of a state road maintenance crew? 
The plaintiff sought damages for negligent infliction of serious 
mental distress as well as for injury to the home.89 The court 
found that "the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of 
serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protec- 
ti~n."~O Artificial barriers to recovery, such as the impact or zone 
of danger tests, were not applied; rather, the court relied on gen- 
eral tort principles to determine the appropriateness of reco~ery.~' 
Although these cases indicate a trend to reject the impact 
and zone of danger rules and to rely instead on general negligence 
principles in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, most 
jurisdictions are not presently willing to extend the scope of lia- 
bility to allow damages for emotional distress resulting from neg- 
ligent injury to a property interest. Consequently, as a remedy for 
failure to defend in title insurance cases, a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is generally not helpful.g2 
C. Breach of an Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
In several jurisdictions, every insurance contract is consid- 
ered to contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal- 
ing." Breach of this covenant gives rise to an independent tort 
86. Id. 
87. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). 
88. Id. at 159, 472 P.2d at 513. 
89. Id. at 160, 472 P.2d at 513-14. 
90. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. 
91. Id. The court concluded that "the question of whether the defendant is liable [for 
damages for emotional distress] to the plaintiff in any particular case will be solved most 
justly by the application of general tort principles." Id. It is clear from the discussion in 
this case and the authorities cited that the impact and zone of danger rules are not 
considered general tort principles but are considered limitations on general tort principles. 
92. See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra. 
93. The following states appear to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
each insurance contract: Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of America, 325 So. 2d 
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action for "bad faith," notwithstanding that the acts complained 
of may also constitute a breach of contract.94 As with most tort 
actions, the plaintiff may recover for all damages proximately 
resulting from the breach,95 including any emotional distress suf- 
fered? 
It is generally easier to carry the burden of proof in an action 
for breach of implied covenant of good faith than in an action for 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
plaintiff need not show outrageous conduct or negligence on the 
part of the defendant?' Mere failure of the insurer to defend 
creates a cause of action. I t  also appears that the impact and zone 
of danger rules may not apply,g8 thus permitting recovery of dam- 
ages for emotional distress caused by injury to a property interest. 
In Jarchow, for example, the defendant title insurer claimed that 
i t  did not have a duty to defend? The court found that a t  the 
time of the suit, from the facts known to the insurance company, 
a potential of liability existed. Therefore, the insurer had a duty 
to defend. Breach of that duty was held to be a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.loO The court 
awarded $170 for loss of the use of the land, $7100 for attorneys' 
fees, and $200,000 for emotional distress.lol 
At present, because of its lighter burden of proof, an action 
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
appears to be the best approach for policyholders seeking to re- 
143 (Ala. 1975); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Sew. Corp., 29 
Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 
540 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1975); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alas. 1974); 
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Key 
Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 129 Ga. App. 192, 198 S.E.2d 919 (1973); Matthews v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 292, 510 P.2d 1315 (1973). 
94. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (Nev. 1975). 
95. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra. 
96. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 939, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (Ct. App. 1975). This may not 
always be the case. See text accompanying note 104 infra. 
97. Id. at 939 n.14, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486 n.14. 
98. To require impact or presence in a zone of danger before damages for m e n d  
distress are allowed in breach of implied covenants of good faith cases makes little sense, 
since only under unusual circumstances would an insurer's breach result in impact or 
danger to the insured. 
99. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 940, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (Ct. App. 1975). 
100. Id. at 943-44, 122 Cal. Rptr. a t  488. The court noted in passing that an alterna- 
tive to assuming the defense of its insured when the issue of coverage is unclear is a 
declaratory relief action to test its duty. If the insurer elects not to file a declaratory relief 
action but to treat the alleged title defect as illusory, the court concluded that the insurer 
must bear the risk of its decision, and may subsequently be found to have acted in bad 
faith. Id. a t  942-43 nn.16 & 18, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 488 nn.16 & 18. 
101. Id. at 923, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 476. 
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cover damages for emotional distress caused by failure of the title 
insurer to defend.lo2 Several problems, however, limit its useful- 
ness. First, not all states read this covenant into insurance con- 
tracts.lo3 Second, it is not clear at this point how future courts will 
deal with emotional distress damages awarded under this cause 
of action. It may be that barriers similar to the impact or zone of 
danger tests will be imposed to limit recovery of mental distress 
damages. For example, the California courts require "substantial 
damage," apart from the emotional distress, before recovery can 
be obtained.lo4 
Most of the changes in the law governing the award of dam- 
ages for emotional distress have resulted from the conflict created 
by the use of arbitrary rules, such as the impact and zone of 
danger rules, to eliminate vexatious and fictitious claims.lo5 The 
mechanical application of these rules often creates inequitable 
resultslo6 and offends the principle that the law provides a remedy 
for every wrong. This is particularly true when the emotional 
distress arises from injury to a property interest. The conflict is 
illustrated clearly in the area of title insurance where, in most 
jurisdictions, the requirement of actual or threatened impact to 
the person precludes damages for emotional distress, even in 
cases where genuine emotional injury has occurred.lo7 
The special relationship between the title insurer and in- 
sured makes the risk of emotional distress foreseeable and should 
require compensation by the title insurer for emotional distress 
resulting from breach of the title insurer's duties to the policy- 
holder. The typical title insurance policyholder is a homeowner 
who, in order to obtain financing for his home, was required by 
the mortgage company to buy a title insurance policy. This un- 
sophisticated purchaser has no input into the contract he 
signslo8 and reasonably expects that title insurance will protect 
his investment from future title problems.lO@ Loss of this most 
102. See text accompanying notes 93-100 supra. 
103. See note 93 supra. 
104. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 944, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 489 (Ct. App. 1975). 
105. See text accompanying notes 43-52 w p m .  
106. Id. 
107. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra. 
108. See Duty to Search, supra note 1, at 1179. 
109. Curtis, supra note 3, at 1. 
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important investment could reasonably be expected to create ex- 
treme emotional upheaval in his life. The title insurance com- 
pany, on the other hand, represents an institution that, in many 
states, holds a virtual monopoly on the abstracting busine~s."~ 
The general public depends upon these companies for accurate 
reports of the state of title.lll 
Jarchow typifies the type of case that in most states would 
have no adequate remedy. In that case, the plaintiffs invested 
their life savings in a plan to build a small b u s i n e s ~ . ~ ~  They 
obtained the land along with a title insurance policy and were 
about to proceed when an adverse claimant clouded the title to 
the land.l13 The title insurer refused to defend, leaving the plain- 
tiffs with no choice but to clear the title themselves.114 The subse- 
quent court action exhausted their savings, created mental stress 
as they strove to extricate themselves, and eventually resulted in 
a failure to achieve their goals.l15 Had the title insurer defended, 
the plaintiffs' expectations a t  the time they bought the policy 
would have been fulfilled. They would have had no expense. In 
addition, return of their investment in the event that title to the 
land remained clouded would have been assured. 
A better solution to the problems of damages for emotional 
distress would seem to be one suggested years ago by Dean Pros- 
ser and now accepted by several of the states, as illustrated by 
the cases cited earlier in this ~omment.*~VI"he problem, according 
to Prosser, should be confronted and resolved by rules of proof 
rather than by imposition of limits on the negligence action it- 
self.ll' The growing competence of medical science in the field of 
psychic injuries has diminished the problems of proof in this 
area.l18 Many authorities now feel that science can establish with 
reasonable medical certainty the existence and severity of psychic 
harm and that the case law involving damages for emotional 
distress should evolve to keep pace with the increased sophistica- 
tion of psychiatry. ll@ Certainly reliance on general negligence 
110. Id. at 20; Quiner, supm note 1, at 721. 
111. See Curtis, supra note 3, at 20. 
112. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 930-31, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470,479-80 (Ct. App. 1975). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 927, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 478. 
115. Id. at 927, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 479. 
116. See text accompanying notes 76-91 supm. 
117. W. PROSSER, supra note 30, # 54, at 328. 
118. 63 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1184 (1975). 
119. See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, # 12, at 50-51. See also Comment, Negligently 
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1253 
(1971). For an excellent case which reviews these arguments, see Rodrigues v. State, 52 
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). 
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principles would provide a more equitable solution for merito- 
rious cases in all areas of the law, including title insurance, while 
still guarding against vexatious and fictitious claims. Further, the 
availability of a remedy for wrongful infliction of emotional dis- 
tress would encourage title insurers to defend within the provi- 
sions of their policies. 
